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Abstract
This paper develops a new theory and model for information val-
idation. The model represents relationships between variables using
Bayesian networks and utilises probabilistic propagation to estimate
the expected values of variables. If the estimated value of a variable
differs from the actual value, then an apparent fault is detected. The
fault is only apparent since it may be that the estimated value is itself
based on faulty data.
The theory extends our understanding of when it is possible to
isolate real faults from potential faults and supports the development
of an algorithm that is capable of isolating real faults without deferring
the problem to the use of expert provided domain specific rules.
To enable practical adoption for real-time processes, an any time
version of the algorithm is developed, that, unlike most other algo-
rithms, is capable of returning improving assessments of the validity
of the sensors as it accumulates more evidence with time.
The developed model is tested by applying it to the validation of
temperature sensors during the start up phase of a Gas turbine when
conditions are not stable; a problem that is known to be challenging.
The paper concludes with a discussion of the practical applicability
and scalability of the model.
1
Probabilistic Information Validation 2
1 Introduction
Artificial intelligence (AI) is playing an increasingly important role in do-
mains like communications, medicine, finance and industry. Examples of
industrial applications include the control of advanced manufacturing plants
[2], control in the power generation process [24], network management for
power distribution, and chemical processes. In medicine, several diagnosis
systems have been designed and tested with increasingly satisfying results
[4, 7]. In finance, forecasting systems have been used for decision making in
all the operations of the field [1].
In general, AI methods are moving towards more realistic domains that re-
quire co-operation between several fields of research. Examples of these meth-
ods include probabilistic reasoning, planning, case based reasoning, model
based reasoning and artificial neural networks. All these methods require a
model for the representation of the domain knowledge. The models are fed
through the input variables, with the information obtained from the process.
In general, information can be obtained from several sources depending on
the application domain. For example, many applications receive information
provided by human agents. Other applications receive information through
sensors or instrumentation. In industrial processes, a decision based on faulty
data could lead to a disaster. Consider for example the case of temperature
sensors in a gas turbine of a thermoelectric power plant. The temperature is
considered the most important parameter in the operation of a turbine since
it performs more optimally at higher temperatures. However, a little increase
in the temperature, over a permitted value, may cause severe damage in the
turbine itself and in the process. Now, imagine that one of the sensors is
faulty, then the following situations might arise:
1. The sensor indicates no change in the temperature even if it increases
to dangerous levels.
2. The sensor reports a dangerous situation even if it is normal.
The first situation may cause a disaster, with possible fatal consequences for
the whole plant, including human life. The cost of this type of failure can not
be easily calculated. The second situation, as described above, may cause a
false shut down, and loss of time and money. In this case, the cost can be
calculated based on the fuel spent and the cost of the energy not produced
while the plant is idle.
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As another example, consider an incident that occurred on Canadian Air
Transit Airbus from Toronto to Lisbon in 2001. Both Engines of the Airbus
shut down, one after the other, as it crossed the Atlantic but the pilots
doubted the consistency of the sensors readings and had to deduce that the
problems were due to fuel loss. The pilots were able to divert the flight, fly
the Aircraft as a glider and land it safely [13]. This illustrates the potential
impact of the lack of proper information validation, which contributed to
risking the lives of 306 passengers.
Besides the need for validated information, these types of applications
require real time behaviour. By definition, the response of a real time sys-
tem depends not only on the logical result of the computation but also on
the time at which the results are produced [31]. Usually, real applications
possess a time limit by which some actions must be performed. This paper
presents a new theory and an any time algorithm for probabilistic information
validation.
Section 2 presents a description of the information validation problem in
intelligent systems. Section 3 develops a theory and a model for validation
based on probabilistic methods. Section 4 extends the algorithm to make
it appropriate for performing in real time environments. Section 5 presents
an empirical evaluation of the algorithm by applying it to the validation of
sensors in an industrial plant. Section 6 concludes the paper with a discussion
of the practical applicability of the model.
2 Information Validation
What do we mean by information validation? In the context of this work,
information refers to the set of variables that some application requires for
its decision process. These variables are considered the input variables to an
intelligent system. Additionally, this work considers only those applications
where the process can be modelled using input information and some mech-
anism, where relations between the different variables can be described, e.g.,
dependency relations. In this context, input information can be considered
as provided by sensors.
The input of a sensor is the value Vs which is considered unknown and
inaccessible, and the output is the measurement Vm (Fig. 1). A sensor is de-
clared faulty if the output measurement Vm gives an incorrect representation
of the Vs [37].
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Figure 1: Basic model of a sensor.
Thus, in this paper, information validation is the process of determining
the validity of the readings reported by a collection of variables or sensors.
Typical approaches for the detection of incorrect representations of a
sensor include the use of:
• Hardware redundancy and majority voting: where hardware instrumen-
tation (or the information agent) is duplicated and a voting algorithm
is used to exclude erroneous information.
• Analytical redundancy: in which all process, actuators and sensors are
monitored centrally. This approach requires the development of mathe-
matical or analytical models whose solution require expensive computer
power.
• Temporal redundancy: in which repeated measurements are taken and
related with some statistical mechanism.
Hardware redundancy is not always feasible for economical or availability
reasons. On the other hand, analytical and temporal redundancy presents
several problems including [14]:
• The relationships between the process variables needs to be identified,
and represented with differential equations. This can be difficult, and
sometimes impossible.
• The approach is very sensitive to modelling errors. That is, the effects
of modelling errors obscures the effects of faults and is therefore a source
of false alarms.
• It requires the development of a domain dependent fault diagnosis pro-
cess.
Utilising analytical redundancy demands an enormous amount of expertise
to use it in a different process or even make a modification of the monitored
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system. Additionally, some application domains have no useful model at all,
such as medicine and finance. These problems have encouraged the develop-
ment of the alternative approach to information validation that is presented
in this paper.
3 Model, Theory and Algorithm
This section begins with a description of the problem and then develops the
theory and validation algorithm. An illustrative example is used throughout
the section to motivate the theory and algorithm.
The information validation problem can be summarised as: how do we
validate the input variables of an application, or equivalently, how do we
identify any faulty sensor readings of a process?
A reasonable starting point towards solving this problem, that is taken by
most existing algorithms, is to estimate the value of a variable using the other
variables and then reporting a failure if the actual reading differs significantly
from the estimated value. This may be adequate for simple cases, such as
validating height against age, but is not adequate for other examples such as
sensor validation. To appreciate the problem, suppose we have a process or
application that has five input variables: {m, t, p, g, a} and that, somehow, we
are able to relate these variables. Suppose in our example, that the variable
t is incorrect (or faulty). Use of the other variables may find that t is faulty.
However, use of the faulty t will also lead to poor estimates of other variables
and hence lead to correct variables being reported as faulty. Thus the main
questions, which are tackled in this section are:
• How can we represent the relationships between the variables and es-
timate the expected values of variables?
• Is it possible to isolate the real faults, and if so, under what circum-
stances can they be isolated?
• Can we develop a suitable algorithm that does not rely on redundancy?
How can we obtain the relationships between the variables so as to en-
able us to estimate the other variables? Some authors have used neural
networks [20], one for each variable. However, this doesn’t help much in
overcoming the problem of distinguishing between the real and apparent
faults. Instead, this research uses Bayesian networks [26] to represent the
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relationships, which as we will see below, helps with the problem of iso-
lating real from apparent faults and is a more appropriate representation
given that estimates of variables are not precise but imply a probabilistic
distribution. As an example, Fig.2 shows how the relationships between
the five variables {m, t, p, g, a} can be represented in a Bayesian network. A
Bayesian network also includes the conditional probability distribution defin-
ing P (X|parents(X)) for each node X and a prior probability distribution
for root nodes.
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Figure 2: A Bayesian network representing a simple process.
But how could such a network be obtained? The use of Bayesian networks
means that we can capitalise on the significant amount of research on learning
Bayesian networks, from the early algorithms of Chow and Liu [10] to the
more recent work of Chickering [9] that are able to learn such networks given
the data. A further benefit is that probabilistic propagation (or inference
methods) can be used to estimate the probability distribution of a particular
variable given the other variables. For example, we could set the values for
the variables m, p, g, a and then use propagation methods to estimate the
probability distribution of t, which could then be used to assess if the value
reported for t is valid.
This still leaves the main problem:
How can the real faults be isolated from the apparent ones?
The key insight of this research is that adoption of Bayesian networks enables
us to take advantage of a useful property: that a faulty reading leads to the
observation of potential faults in a particular set of variables. This set is
known as the Markov blanket of the variable which is defined as follows [26].
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Definition 3.1 A Markov blanket MB(X) of any variable X ∈ V is a
subset S ⊂ V where X /∈ S for which
I(X,S, V − S −X).
where I(A,B,C) denotes the conditional independence of A and C given B.
For example, in Fig. 2, I(t, {m, a, g}, p) so t is conditionally independent
from p given the set {m, a, g}. Thus, MB(t) = {m, a, g}. The following
corollary defines a Markov blanket that can be used in Bayesian networks [26].
Corollary 3.1 In any Bayesian network, the union of the following three
types of neighbours is sufficient for forming a Markov blanket of a node X:
the direct parents PA(X), the direct successors, SU(X) and all the spouses
SP(X) (ie, direct parents of X’s direct successors).
The reader is referred to Gieger [16] for a proof. Although there may be other
Markov blankets, only this type of blanket is considered and assumed in the
theory below. A useful symmetry property of Markov blankets that we will
need later is that a variable X is in the Markov blanket of all the variables Y
that are in the Markov blanket of X and it is only in these Markov blankets.
Lemma 3.1 (symmetry)
Let X be a node in a Bayesian network G = (V,E) with a Markov blanket
MB(X), X ∈MB(Y ) iff Y ∈MB(X), ∀Y ∈ V .
Proof:
First, the proof that if Y ∈ MB(X) then X ∈ MB(Y ). Given that
MB(X) = PA(X) ∪ SU(X) ∪ SP (X), then Y ∈ PA(X) or Y ∈ SU(X) or
Y ∈ SP (X), so X ∈ SU(Y ) or X ∈ PA(Y ) or X ∈ SP (Y ), respectively. In
any case, X ∈MB(Y ).
Next, the proof that if Y /∈MB(X) thenX /∈MB(Y ). By Definition 3.1:
I(X,MB(X), V −MB(X)−X).
By the Symmetry axiom (from [27])
I(V −MB(X)−X,MB(X), X).
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Now, if Y /∈MB(X) and Y 6= X, then
Y ∈ V −MB(X)−X.
Hence, by the Decomposition axiom (from [27])
I(Y,MB(X), X), ∀ Y ∈ V −MB(X)−X.
Thus X is not in MB(Y ).¦
Returning to the validation problem, the process can begin by assuming
that the input variables, one by one, are suspect. By probabilistic propaga-
tion, the system can decide if the value of an input is correct based on the
values of the most related variables. So, to see if the value of t is correct,
the other variable values can be used to predict t. This is done by instanti-
ating the other nodes in the model and obtaining the posterior probability
distribution of the value of t. From this probability distribution, an estimate
of t is calculated. Then, if the predicted value is different from the observed
value, a fault is detected (The precise detection criterion will be explained
below). This process can be repeated for all the input variables resulting in
a list of apparently faulty variables.
Notice that when t fails, the list of apparently faulty nodes is {m, t, g, a}
which corresponds to the Markov blanket of t plus the variable itself. This
is called the extended Markov blanket (EMB) of a variable. Table 1 shows
the EMBs for each variable. That is, if the input of a variable is erroneous,
then the above validation process will report a fault in all the variables in
its extended Markov blanket. This is a general result that is now formailised
and proved.
Table 1: Extended Markov blankets for the model of Fig. 2.
process variable Extended Markov Blanket
m {m, t, p}
t {m, t, g, a}
p {m, p}
g {t, g}
a {t, a}
Formally, given a probability distribution P on a set of variables V , a
DAG (Directed Acyclic Graph) G is a Bayesian network if it represents the
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dependency model M for a the probability distribution P [26]. Like other
sensor validation models, the theory developed makes the following assump-
tions:
1. Observability: all the variables can be measured directly.
2. Fault detection: if there is an error in variable X it can always be
detected. This is a real fault denoted by Fr(X).
3. Fault propagation: if a variable Y has a real fault Fr(Y ), and Y ∈
MB(X), a fault in X will be detected. This is called an apparent fault.
Assumption 1 is common across any application. Assumption 2 is im-
plicit in most sensor validation models and the extent to which it is valid
for a particular application depends on how accurately a variable’s expected
value can be estimated and the extent to which its reading departs from the
expected value. Bayesian networks are developed specifically for represent-
ing probability distributions of the data and have been used successfully in
many applications [25], and as such, one would expect them to be as good
as any other model for estimating the expected distribution of variables. As-
sumption 2 would not, of course, hold for very mild faults where the readings
would not depart enough from the expected value.
The extent to which assumption 3 holds depends on how well the de-
pendencies between the variables have been captured. Weak dependencies
would violate the assumption. However, learning algorithms rarely produce
Bayesian networks that include weak dependencies and if the Bayesian net-
works are constructed manually, there are techniques, such as those developed
by van Engelen [34] that enable the removal of weak links since they con-
tribute least to representing the distribution of the data. We discuss these
assumptions further in the conclusion of the paper when we consider the
practical applicability and scalability of the model.
Given the above model and its assumptions, the key property that enables
identification of the real faults can be stated as the following lemma.
Lemma 3.2 If there is an error in variable X, it will produce a potential
fault in X, and all the variables in MB(X), and no other variable.
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Proof:
From assumption 2, an error in X produces a potential fault in X. From
Lemma 3.1, X is an element of the MB of all variables Y ∈ MB(X). So
by assumption 3, an error in X produces potential faults in all variables in
MB(X). Finally, from Lemma 3.1, X is not an element of any other MB, so
it will not produce a potential fault in any other variable.¦
The following corollary follows from directly from this lemma.
Corollary 3.2 If there is an error in variable X with EMB(X), and also
an error in Y with EMB(Y ) they will produce potential faults in all nodes
Z ∈ EMB(X) ∪ EMB(Y ). In general, if there are errors in variables Xi,
i = 1, . . . ,m, they will produce potential faults in all nodes Z ∈ EMB(X1)∪
. . . ∪ EMB(Xm).
Given the above lemmas and corollary, we can state and prove the follow-
ing theorem for distinguishing a single fault when the set of apparent faults
is S.
Theorem 3.1 (Single Faults)
If S = EMB(X), and there is no Y 6= X such that EMB(Y ) ⊆ S, then
there is a single real fault in X.
Proof
If Fr(X) then theorem 3.1 leads to S = EMB(X), i.e., there are apparent
faults in all the EMB(X).
Now, by contradiction, suppose there is a Y 6= X such that Fr(Y ). Then,
by Lemma 3.2, there are apparent faults in EMB(Y ). Here, since S contains
all the potential faults, there is a contradiction because from Corollary 3.2
EMB(Y ) ⊆ S.¦
In practice, there may also be multiple faults, so a valid question, ad-
dressed by the following theorems is: under what circumstances can we dis-
tinguish multiple faults?
Theorem 3.2 (Multiple Faults)
If there is a unique combination:
S = EMB(X1) ∪ EMB(X2) ∪ . . . ∪ EMB(Xn)
then Fr(X1) ∧ Fr(X2) ∧ . . . ∧ Fr(Xn) can be identified.
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Proof:
A unique combination means that ∀Xk 6= Xi, i = 1, . . . , n then
EMB(Xk) 6⊆ EMB(X1) ∪ EMB(X2) ∪ . . . ∪ EMB(Xn) and
EMB(Xj) 6⊆ ∪i 6=jEMB(Xi), j = 1, . . . , n
Thus, by definition, S = EMB(X1) ∪ EMB(X2) ∪ . . . ∪ EMB(Xn) so,
an additional faulty variable Xk implies EMB(Xk) ⊆ S, and there is a
contradiction of the uniqueness condition.
Now, assuming that one of the Xi is not faulty, i.e., ¬Xj where 1 ≤ j ≤ n,
then by Lemma 3.2, the potential faulty set will be
S = ∪i6=jEMB(Xi).
Since the combination is unique, then EMB(Xj) 6⊆ S, which is a contradiction.¦
If the conditions of this theorem are not met, it is relatively easy to show
that the multiple faults can not be distinguished.
Figure 3: Representation of the EMBs as sets indicating the different cases:
(a) no failure, (b) a single distinguishable fault in a, (c) a indistinguishable
double fault in m and p, (d) a multiple distinguishable fault in g and a.
Figure 3 illustrates the theorems on the above example by viewing EMBs
as sets of variables in a Venn diagram. In (a) a representation of all the
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EMBs is shown when there is no fault (no dark area). In (b), a represen-
tation of the case when S = {t, a} is shown. It is clear that this is a unique
set, i.e., there is a single distinguishable fault. In (c), a representation of the
indistinguishable double fault is given since it is not possible to distinguish
the set {m, t, p} and its union with the set {m, p}. The case of multiple
distinguishable faults is shown in (d). This case shows a unique union of two
sets. As pointed out by a referee, although the notion of a Markov blan-
ket is not probabilistic, the dependencies are probabilistic and judgement of
whether a variable has an error remains probabilistic.
This theory leads to the information validation algorithm given in Fig. 4
which is illustrated on the probabilistic model of Fig. 2, from step 2 onwards.
Step 2 produces the EMB table given in Table 1. Suppose steps 3 to 5 give the
results shown in Table 2. Then, step 6 indicates that S = {m, p} = EMB(p)
so it can be concluded that the real fault is in variable p. Notice that there is
no other EMB ⊆ S so according to step 6(b), it is a single fault. As another
example, suppose that t is faulty. In such a case, the potentially faulty list
would be S = {m, t, g, a} = EMB(t). Steps 6(c) therefore applies, i.e., there
is a real fault in t but possibly (and indistinguishable) real faults in variables
g and a.
Table 2: Steps 3, 4 and 5 of the algorithm for the example of Fig. 2.
validating result faults list S
m fails {m}
t correct {m}
p fails {m, p}
g correct {m, p}
a correct {m, p}
4 Any Time Validation
The information validation process described in the previous section takes all
the inputs, performs the validation and produces a list of faulty sensors – i.e.,
no intermediate results are available. This may be adequate for a number
of applications; however, for real time applications, these characteristics are
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1. Obtain the Bayesian network of the information variables of the ap-
plication process.
2. Make a list of the variables to be validated (usually all) and build a
table of EMBs.
3. Take each one of the variables to be checked as the hypothesis, instan-
tiate the variables that form the Markov blanket of the hypothesis,
and propagate the probabilities to obtain the posterior probability
distribution of the variable given the evidence.
4. Compare the predicted value (the maximum posterior probability)
with the current value of the variable and decide if an error exists.
5. Repeat steps 3 and 4 until all the variables in the list have been
examined and the set of variables with apparent faults (S) is obtained.
6. Compare the set of apparently faulty variables obtained in step 5,
with the table of the EMB for each variable:
(a) If S = φ there are no faults.
(b) If S is equal to the EMB of a variable X, and there is no other
EMB which is a subset of S, then there is a single real fault in
X.
(c) If S is equal to the EMB of a variable X, and there are one or
more EMBs which are subsets of S, then there is a real fault
in X, and possibly, real faults in the variables whose EMBs are
subsets of S.
(d) If S is equal to the union of several EMBs and the combination
is unique (defined below), there are multiple distinguishable real
faults in all the variables whose EMB are in S.
(e) If none of the above cases is satisfied, then there are multiple
faults but they can not be distinguished. All the variables whose
EMBs are subsets of S could have a real fault.
Figure 4: Basic information validation algorithm.
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inadequate, for example when an urgent decision to stop a costly process is
required.
This section describes how the algorithm developed above is extended to
an any time algorithm that is more appropriate for real time applications.
Any time algorithms are those that can be interrupted at any point during
computation, and return an answer whose quality increases as it is allocated
additional time [12, 18, 8, 19].
The key to developing an any time information validation algorithm is
to recognize that the knowledge about the state of the variables (faulty or
correct) becomes more certain and complete as time progresses. Certainty
about the state of a variable refers to the degree of belief in the correctness
of a variable, and completeness is characterized by the number of variables
whose state is known. Thus, it is required to be able to monitor the state of
the variables during all the validation process. This is done by using a vector
whose elements Pf (si) represent the probabilities of failure for the variables
si. Given that the any time validation process needs to be cyclic, the top
level of the algorithm can take the form shown in Fig. 5. The following
subsections develop and describe the steps of the any time algorithm.
1. Initialize Pf (si) for all variables si.
2. While there are unvalidated variables do:
(a) select the next variable to validate
(b) validate it
(c) update the probability of failure vector Pf
(d) measure the quality of the partial response
Figure 5: Top level of the any time validation algorithm.
4.1 Selection of next variable
This section develops a model for choosing the best variable to validate next
given the history of the validation process and the current state of the system.
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Also, the model proposed here will be used for measuring the quality of
the response in order to obtain the performance profile of the validation
algorithm.
The central idea is that the validation of a variable provides informa-
tion about the validity of the variables, and different variables will provide
different degrees of information. Hence, if we can measure the amount of
information that can be provided by each variable, the most promising one
can be selected. The measure of information utilised is the standard one,
defined as follows by Shannon[30].
Definition 4.1 Given a finite probability distribution
pi ≥ 0 for (i = 1, . . . , n), and ∑n pi = 1
Shannon’s entropy measure is defined as
Hn = Hn(p1, . . . , pn) = −
n∑
i=1
pilog2pi (1)
Since the validation of a variable s has two possible outcomes (correct or
faulty), the entropy function H(s) is then defined as:
H(s) =
{
0 if p = 0 or p = 1
−plog2(p)− (1− p)log2(1− p) otherwise (2)
where p represents the probability of failure of the variable. Thus, considering
each single variable validation as an independent experiment, this function
can be used to measure the amount of information provided by that valida-
tion. Then, the average amount of information E for the system S can be
defined as follows:
E(s1, . . . , sn) = 1
n
n∑
i=1
H(si)
= − 1
n
n∑
i=1
[Pf (si)log2Pf (si) + (1− Pf (si))log2(1− Pf (si))]
= − 2
n
n∑
i=1
Pf (si)log2Pf (si) (3)
Probabilistic Information Validation 16
Where the last step is due to the symmetry of Pf log2Pf , n is the number of
variables and Pf (si) represents the current probability of failure assigned to
variable si.
Given this measure, the any time validation algorithm needs to select a
variable X ∈ S that gives the best improvement in the average entropy of
the system S. Hence the following conditional version of equation 3 can be
written:
E(S | X) = E(S | X = correct) + E(S | X = faulty)
=
1
n
(∑
H(si | X = correct) +
∑
H(si | X = faulty)
)
. (4)
This function can be evaluated for each variable and the one which gives
the most information (the minimum E(S | Xi)) can be selected as the next
variable Xi to be validated. However, the computation suggested by the
above formulae could be too expensive for a real time validation process. To
overcome this problem, a pre-compilation of the variable selection mechanism
is developed as follows. The above formulae are used to select the variable,
sr which gives the most information. This selected variable forms the root of
a binary decision tree. A fault is simulated in this variable and the formulae
are again used to select the next variable sr−. Then, the root sr is assumed
to be correct, and the formulae are used to select the variable sr+ in this
case. This results in the partial decision tree shown in Fig. 6.
µ´¶³sr−
µ´¶³sr
µ´¶³sr+
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Figure 6: Partial decision tree.
This process is repeated recursively on the nodes sr− and sr+ to obtain a
complete decision tree, so that each path in the tree includes all the variables.
As an example, consider again the network shown in Fig. 2. This process
results in the decision tree shown in Fig. 7. This decision tree can be used to
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select the next variable more efficiently in real time than by performing the
calculations. Thus, the selection step of the algorithm of Fig. 5 consists of
simply traversing the tree one level after every single variable validation. The
cycle starts at the root, and the decision tree points to the next node in the
tree according to the result of validating the current variable. Notice that the
binary tree for n variables contains n levels and up to 2n−1 nodes1. Then, if a
system has 21 input variables, the binary tree would require 1,048,575 nodes,
and assuming 10 bytes per node this tree requires more than 10 Mbytes
of memory. Hence, to accommodate situations when memory is short, an
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Figure 7: Binary tree indicating the order of validation given the response of
the validation step.
alternative approach to the pre-compilation of the decision tree is used. This
considers the sequence of validations when single faults are simulated in all
the variables of the system. Of course, the case of no faults at all must also
be considered. Table 3 presents the valid trajectories followed in the case
of failures (first column) of the example of Fig 2. The plus sign represents
the correct validations while the minus sign represents a faulty condition
in the variable. The first variable to validate is always t since it has the
lowest conditional entropy. The first row indicates the case of no failures.
The second row presents the sequence of validation when m is simulated as
faulty. Here, all m′sEMB will be faulty. Representing the information of
Table 3 in a decision tree results in a pruned tree with n levels and at most
1The exact number is (2n − 1)− 2n−2.
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n×(n+1) nodes as shown in Fig. 8. This is because only the rows in Table 3
would be trajectories in the tree from the root to the leaves.
Table 3: Trajectories of validation in the case of single faults. The + repre-
sents the validation as correct while - represents a fault in the variable.
case first second third fourth fifth
no fault t+ m+ p+ g+ a+
m t− m− p− g+ a+
t t− m− p+ g− a−
p t+ m− g+ p− a+
g t− m+ g− a+ p+
a t− m+ g+ p+ a−
t
m m
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p
p p
g
g g
g
g
a a a
a
a a
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-
Figure 8: Reduced decision tree.
Notice the sequence of validations when no fault is found, i.e. t, m, p,
g and a, which corresponds specifically to the right hand branch in Fig. 8.
This trajectory is considered as default when an invalid sequence is found.
For example, suppose that the sequence is: t correct, andm faulty. According
to Fig. 8 the next variable to validate is g but the tree only considers a valid
trajectory when g is correct. If g is faulty, then the default trajectory would
be followed (p would be the next node in this example).
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Notice that, even if the decision tree was defined following the single fault
assumption, the existence of multiple faults will also be detected.
4.2 Isolation
The validation step provides only a list of potentially faulty variables. Thus,
a comparison is made between the set of potentially faulty variables with
the table of extended Markov blankets of all the variables. When a match
is found, a real fault is determined. However, the set of potentially faulty
variables is obtained after all the variables have been validated. Therefore,
in order to extend that algorithm for any time behaviour, a different mecha-
nism for distinguishing real faults from apparent ones is required. This new
mechanism is achieved by using the fact that real faults lead to the observa-
tion of apparent faults and defining a two level Bayesian network.The first
level consists of the nodes that represent the events of real failure in every
variable and the second level is formed by nodes representing apparent fail-
ures in all the variables. Arcs are included between every root node, and
the corresponding nodes of the extended Markov blanket. For example, the
causal network shown in Fig. 9 can be obtained directly from the Bayesian
network given in Fig. 2.
Rm Rt Rp Rg Ra
Am At Ap Ag Aa
cmt
cmm
Figure 9: Probabilistic causal model for fault isolation in the example of
Fig. 2. Ri represents a real fault in variable i while Aj represents an apparent
fault in variable j. cmt represents the conditional probability of obtaining an
apparent fault in variable t (At) given a real fault in m (Rm).
The network of Fig. 9 is multiply connected and in general, O(2n) condi-
tional probabilities would be required (for a node with n parents). However,
the noisy or model can be adopted here. Two assumptions need to hold in
order to use this model [26]:
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1. No apparent fault occurs without being caused by some real fault (ac-
countability).
2. If an apparent fault Aj is a consequence of two real faults R1 and R2,
then the inhibition of the occurrence of Aj under R1 is independent of
the mechanisms of inhibition of Aj under R2 (exception independence).
The accountability assumption holds by the way the model is constructed,
i.e., a variable is apparently faulty only if there is a fault in its MB. The
exception independence assumption holds by assumption 3 on page 9 since
the relationship between the real and apparent faults is obtained from a
Bayesian network that represents the dependencies between variables. Hence,
the probability of a real fault not resulting in an apparent fault is small.
Further, the mechanism by which a real fault in one variable does not result
in an apparent fault is even less likely to be dependent on another real fault.
Hence, given that these assumptions are reasonable, the noisy-or model
can be adopted and enables us to utilise the above Bayesian network structure
where the only parameters required are cij = P (Aj | Ri only).2
In the case of the information validation problem, in an ideal case, all the
parameters cij ≈ 1. In the rare cases where this assumption is not valid, we
can still utilise the model by estimating cij by use of simulation.
The network of Fig. 9 is initialized with the following information: (i)
the prior probability of all the root nodes in the model is 0.5 (assuming
ignorance at the beginning of a cycle), and (ii) the parameters cij = 0.99
3 for
all present combinations of i, j. Of course, if additional information about
the prior probability is available, it could be incorporated.
Having described how real and apparent faults can be related, the fault
isolation model can now be summarized. It receives as an input, a validated
variable with its detected state (faulty or correct) and updates the probability
of failure of all the variables. It does this by instantiating the value of the
corresponding apparent failure node and using a propagation algorithm to
obtain the posterior probabilities of the real faulty nodes. A vector Pf of
these posterior probabilities represents the current state of knowledge about
the variables, and can be viewed as the output of the system at any time.
Table 4 illustrates how this process works if there was a fault in g for the
network of Fig. 2.
2The reader is refereed to Pearl [26] for details of the noisy or model.
3An arbitrary number close to 1.0 was used.
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Table 4: Example of the values of the probability vector Pf .
Step Pf (m) Pf (t) Pf (p) Pf (g) Pf (a)
t = faulty 0.534 0.534 0.5 0.534 0.534
m = correct 0.013 0.013 0.009 0.663 0.663
g = faulty 0.009 0.019 0.009 0.99 0.502
a = correct 0.009 0.0 0.009 0.999 0.009
p = correct 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.999 0.009
5 Experimental results
This section tests the validation algorithm by applying it to the validation of
temperature sensors of the gas turbine at the Go´mez Palacio power plant in
Me´xico. The experiments are carried out for a subset of the sensor readings
for the start up phase of the plant where thermodynamic conditions change
considerably – a problem that has been acknowledged as very difficult for
sensor validation, even when expert rules and a model based approach are
used [23].
However, the aim of the experiments is not to suggest that on its own,
the model is adequate for fault diagnosis of Gas turbines, which is a large,
complex task that continues to be the subject of significant investment and
research effort, for example, as part of the European Community Network
of Excellence known as Monet [35]. Instead, the model is meant as a com-
ponent to be used by higher level layers, that for example, can perform risk
assessment and fault diagnosis.
The experiments were carried out on a set of 21 temperature sensors
over the first 15 minutes of the start up phase. The instrumentation of the
plant provides the readings of all the sensors every second, resulting in 870
instances. A Bayesian network representing the dependencies between the
sensors of the plant is shown in Fig. 10. The dependency model was obtained
by utilising an automatic learning program that uses real data from the start
up phase of the turbine [32]. A tree was utilised given the low computational
time for inference in this kind of network 4.
The data set was partitioned in two subsets: one partition for training the
4Propagation in trees is known to be significantly more efficient than in arbitrary net-
works
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Figure 10: Probabilistic tree of the application. Nodes represent temperature
signals of a gas turbine.
network, and the other partition for testing. The training/testing partition
used was 70-30 % of the original data set, i.e., 610 instances for training the
model (calculating the prior and conditional probabilities), and 260 instances
for testing.
Two experiments were carried out: the first to see how well the approach
works in terms of accuracy, and the second was to examine the information
theoretic any time selection scheme. Given the absence of other any time
sensor validation algorithms, the information theoretic selection scheme is
compared against one that selects the next sensor to validate at random.
The following subsections present and discuss the results.
5.1 Accuracy
Theoretically, the system should always detect and isolate single faults cor-
rectly. However, in reality, some errors may occur since in practice it is
unlikely that the dependency model will be perfect. Consequently, two types
of errors could occur: a correct reading might be considered faulty, and a
real fault might not be detected. These two possible errors are called type I
and type II errors in the literature, and defined as follows [11]:
type I: rejection of the null hypothesis when it is true, i.e., a correct sensor
is reported as faulty.
type II: acceptance of the null hypothesis when it is actually false, i.e., a
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faulty sensor is not detected.
The criteria for deciding if a reading is faulty or not is to calculate the
distance of the real value from the expected value, and map it to faulty if
it is beyond a specified threshold and to correct if it is less than a specified
threshold. The threshold values considered are 2, 2.5 and 3 times the stan-
dard deviation σ. It’s worth noting that these thresholds are adopted only
to provide an evaluation of the accuracy and that an application that utilises
the model could use the probability distributions instead, for example to
perform risk assessment, minimise costs of misclassification, or develop ROC
curves for a particular application [5, 22, 36]. Two different single faults were
simulated:
Severe. The sensor value selected is substituted by one which differs by
50 %.
Mild. The real value is replaced by one which differs by 25 %.
The test procedure consisted of simulating a fault in the 260 instances de-
scribed above. One set of experiments was made with severe faults, and then
repeated with mild faults. If 260 failures were simulated, then every one of
the 21 sensors was simulated as faulty at least 12 times.
Table 5: Results: percentage errors for severe and mild faults.
Criteria 2σ 2.5σ 3σ
Severe fault
Type I 17.3 % 4.8 % 2.9 %
Type II 0.5 % 0.1 % 0.9 %
Mild fault
Type I 21.5 % 10.3 % 11.4 %
Type II 8.0 % 11.7 % 14.9 %
Table 5 presents the percentage of type I and II errors for severe and mild
faults. Overall, if the 2.5σ criteria is chosen for this application, then the
results suggest over 95% accuracy for severe faults and about 90% accuracy
for mild faults, which provides good empirical support for the theory, model
and algorithm developed. The results indicate that type I errors are the most
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common in this application. That is, there are cases where the existence of
an invalid apparent fault, together with the valid ones, completes the EMB
of a misdiagnosed sensor. Hence, a type I error is produced. In contrast,
type II errors are detected at this stage when most of the sensors of a EMB
present misdiagnosed apparent faults. This is very improbable as the results
of Table 5 confirm.
5.2 Any time performance
Section 4.1 developed an any time information validation algorithm that
utilises an entropy function as a criterion for selecting the next variable to
validate. This entropy function calculates the amount of information that
any single validation provides for diagnosing all the variables. Hence, to
evaluate the any time algorithm, we compare the performance profile of the
algorithm as a function of time when the entropy based measure is used and
when it is not used (i.e., the next sensor is selected at random).
Figure 11 shows the resulting performance profiles. The measure of qual-
ity used is the average entropy E of the variables given in equation 3 but
normalised by the maximum value. That is, if the current quality measure
is:
Q(s1, . . . , sn) = − 2
n
n∑
i=1
Pf (si)log2Pf (si) (5)
then, the reported quality function is calculated with the formula
Q =
Qmax −Qcurrent
Qmax
(6)
where Qmax is the maximum value of the quality measure (i.e., when all the
n nodes have been validated).
The results confirm that using the information-theoretic measure to select
the next variable to validate results in significant improvements to the profile
of the any time sensor validation algorithm.
6 Discussion and Future Work
This paper has presented a novel theory and algorithms for information val-
idation based on the use of Bayesian networks. Other approaches, such as
those that use neural networks, can estimate the expected values of variables
Probabilistic Information Validation 25
Time
Q
ua
lit
y
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
10.32 218.38
Random Entropy
Figure 11: Performance profile of the any time information validation algo-
rithm for sensors (time× 10−2sec.).
but are not able to distinguish apparent faults from real ones. A key insight
of the research is that, unlike other approaches, Bayesian networks enable
the use of a property known as a Markov blanket that leads to a theory for
when it is possible to distinguish real from apparent faults. The theory is
used to develop a validation algorithm that can operate in batch mode and
an extended, any time algorithm. The any time algorithm goes beyond exist-
ing sensor validation algorithms in that it is capable of returning improving
assessments of the validity of the sensors as it accumulates more evidence
with time. The rate at which the any time algorithm improves the quality
of its assessment is accelerated by selecting the next variable to validate on
the basis of the amount of information a variable would contribute.
The theory and algorithms were tested by applying it to the validation
of temperature sensors during the start-up phase of a gas turbine, when
readings are not necessarily stable and for which sensor validation is known
to be very difficult. The accuracy of the model was evaluated by carrying
out experiments to determine the number of sensors incorrectly reported as
faulty or working. In terms of accuracy, the results obtained provide good
supporting evidence for the theory and model, with about 95% accuracy for
severe faults and 90% accuracy for mild faults.
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The any time algorithm was evaluated by carrying out experiments to
determine the performance profile of the algorithm. The experiments were
run with and without the entropy based selection scheme. The results con-
firm a profile that continuously improves the quality of the assessment of the
validity of the sensors, with the the entropy based selection scheme perform-
ing significantly (16 %) better than a scheme that selects the next variable
at random.
The empirical evaluations do not provide evidence of the practical appli-
cability to problems with, say, hundreds of variables. This requires discussion
of the following questions:
• To what extent do the assumptions of the model hold in practice?
• How does the model scale up as the number of variables increases?
The model makes two non-trivial assumptions to enable the development
of the theory. One assumption is that if there is an error in a variable, it will
be detected and the second is that if there is a real fault it will lead to the de-
tection of apparent faults in related variables. The first assumption is made
by most models of validation that depends on the process of estimating an
expected value and the extent to which a reading departs from it. The diverse
range and scale of successful applications of Bayesian networks on scheduling,
medical diagnosis, vehicle control and weather forecasting suggests they are
as good as any other approach for developing estimation models (see Chap-
ter 12 of Neapolitan [25]). Their use does, however, offer the advantage that
they were developed specifically to represent the probability distribution of
the data, their use enables a sound estimate of the expected probability dis-
tribution of a variable and that there is a substantial body of knowledge and
experience of utilising learning algorithms for producing Bayesian networks.
Like other models, the assumption does break down if a reading does not
depart sufficiently from an expected value, for example when there is a very
mild failure.
The extent to which the second assumption is likely to be valid for a
particular application depends heavily on the Bayesian networks of depen-
dencies that are obtained by the use of a Bayesian learning algorithms. Given
a data set, these algorithms aim to construct a Bayesian network that is a
compact and accurate representation of the joint probability distribution of
the data. To achieve this aim, many of these learning algorithms (e.g., Chow
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and Liu [10], Friedman et al. [15]) utilise the mutual information measure to
select which nodes to link. For example, Chow and Liu’s algorithm evaluates
the mutual information measure between all pairs of nodes, selects and links
the best pair and repeats the process until the network is an adequate repre-
sentation of the distribution of the data. This measure is known to be highly
correlated to the degree of dependence of the variables [29] and it is therefore
unlikely that these algorithms would learn a Bayesian network that includes
weak dependencies. Hence, although, there are techniques, such as those
developed by van Engelen[34] for removing weak links, it is unlikely that
any refinement would be necessary to meet the assumptions if a Bayesian
learning algorithm is used.
In terms of time, the main operation is the propagation algorithm used to
estimate the expected distribution of a variable given the other values. There
are several different propagation algorithms and the time-complexity of the
one we utilise is known to be dependent on the size of the largest clique of
the DAG [33]. Hence, scalability will not be an issue for applications where
the size of the biggest Markov blankets is not large, even when the number
of sensors is large. Indeed, a major advantage of Bayesian networks is that
they enable efficient representation of joint probability distributions, avoiding
unnecessary dependencies. However, if there are many interdependencies (i.e.
large EMBs), then propagation would be slow for applications with many (say
hundreds) of sensors. One option for such problems could be to utilise one of
the many parallel propagation algorithms that has been developed [21, 28],
although this would imply additional processors. A better option might be
to partition the problem into more manageable subsets of sensors, each of
which can be validated separately. This could be done by using knowledge
about the domain or, if this is not feasible, utilising the kind of techniques
suggested by the work of Gyftodimos and Flach [17] for restructuring large
Bayesian networks into hierarchical forms.
To conclude, the development of a probabilistic theory of validation has
led to an important result that allows the isolation of real faults from appar-
ent faults, something that is normally deferred to the use of domain specific
rules. The theory has also led to the development of a new any time sensor
validation algorithm that provides an improving assessment of the validity
of the sensors with time.
Future extensions of this work need to address how higher layers could
utilise such a capability to achieve process diagnosis and system diagnosis.
This implies the need to adopt a methodology for representing processes and
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fusing alternative measures, which is investigated in the work of several other
studies (e.g., Satnam et al. [3], and Barigozzi et al. [6]). The model also opens
up the possibility of higher layers using the probabilities of failure, which are
available in this model, to carry out risk assessment [5]. Future work also
needs to apply the algorithm in other domains, such as finance and medicine,
and to test the work on a larger scale.
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